Reforming Intermediary Liability in the Platform Economy: A European Digital Single Market Strategy by Frosio, Giancarlo F.
Copyright  2017 ·by   Giancarlo F. Frosio  
Northwestern  University  Law  Review Vol.  112 
19 
REFORMING INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY IN THE 
PLATFORM ECONOMY: A EUROPEAN DIGITAL 
SINGLE MARKET STRATEGY 
Giancarlo F. Frosio* 
ABSTRACT—Since the enactment of the first safe harbors and liability 
exemptions for online intermediaries like Google and Facebook, market 
conditions have radically changed. Originally, intermediary liability 
exemptions were introduced to promote an emerging internet market. Do 
safe harbors for online intermediaries still serve innovation? Should they be 
limited or expanded? These critical questions—often tainted by 
protectionist concerns—define the present intermediary liability 
conundrum. Today, safe harbors still hold, but secondary liability is on the 
rise. In its Digital Single Market Strategy, the European Commission plans 
to introduce sectorial legislation that would effectively erode liability 
exemptions for online intermediaries, especially platforms. In an attempt to 
close a “value gap” between rightholders and online platforms allegedly 
exploiting protected content, the proposal would implement filtering 
obligations for intermediaries and introduce neighboring rights for online 
uses of press publications. Meanwhile, an upcoming revision of the Audio-
Visual Media Services Directive would ask platforms to put in place 
measures to protect minors from harmful content and to protect everyone 
from incitement to hatred. Finally, the EU Digital Single Market Strategy 
has endorsed voluntary measures as a privileged tool to curb illicit and 
infringing activities online. This Essay contextualizes the recent EU reform 
proposal within a broader move towards turning online intermediaries into 
internet police. This narrative builds exclusively upon governmental or 
content industry assumptions, rather than empirical evidence. Also, the 
intermediary liability discourse is shifting towards an intermediary 
responsibility discourse. Apparently, the European Commission aligns its 
strategy for online platforms to a globalized, ongoing move towards 
privatization of enforcement online through algorithmic tools. This process 
may advance an amorphous notion of responsibility that incentivizes 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the mid-nineties, legislators have provided online 
intermediaries, such as access or hosting providers, with exemptions from 
liability for wrongful activities committed by users through their services.1 
In most cases, safe harbor legislations provide “mere conduit,” caching, 
and hosting exemptions for intermediaries. Safe harbor legislation usually 
does not require intermediaries to monitor the information that they 
transmit or store, or to actively seek facts or circumstances indicating 
illegal activity.2 Nonetheless, recent international policy debates have 
recalibrated towards more secondary liability for online intermediaries. In 
particular, the European Commission has been seriously considering 
narrowing the eCommerce Directive horizontal liability limitations for 
 
 1 For most worldwide safe harbor legislations, see World Intermediary Liability Map (WILMap), 
THE CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, STAN. L. SCH., http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/our-work/projects/
world-intermediary-liability-map-wilmap [https://perma.cc/84L7-VRTU] (last visited June 3, 2017) 
(presenting a project designed and developed by the author). 
 2 See, e.g., The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A–C) (2012) 
[hereinafter DMCA]; Directive 2000/31, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 
on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the 
Internal Market 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 2 (EC) [hereinafter eCommerce Directive]. 
112:251 (2017) Reforming Intermediary Liability in the Platform Economy 
21 
internet intermediaries3 and putting in place a “fit for purpose regulatory 
environment for platforms and intermediaries.”4 
I. A DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET STRATEGY FOR INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY 
In May 2015, the European Union (EU) Commission issued its Digital 
Single Market Strategy (DSMS), announcing steps to be taken “towards a 
connected digital single market” and plans to reform EU copyright.5 The 
theme of the DSMS is “[b]ringing down barriers to unlock online 
opportunities” with the aim of moving the EU from “28 national markets to 
a single one.”6 Reforms proposed by the DSMS address topics including 
ecommerce, cross-border sales, and copyright.7 The Digital Single Market 
Strategy focuses on four main issues: (1) cross-border access to content, (2) 
text- and data-mining, (3) civil enforcement, and (4) the role of ISPs.8 In 
particular, the Commission noted: 
An effective and balanced civil enforcement system against commercial scale 
infringements of copyright is central to investment in innovation and job 
creation. In addition the rules applicable to activities of online intermediaries 
in relation to copyright protected works require clarification, given in 
particular the growing involvement of these intermediaries in content 
distribution. Measures to safeguard fair remuneration of creators also need to 
be considered in order to encourage the future generation of content.9 
Apparently, the European Commission plans to enhance the 
obligations that websites and other internet intermediaries have when 
 
 3 See Patrick Van Eecke, Online Service Providers and Liability: A Plea for a Balanced Approach, 
48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1455, 1463 (2011) (“Section 4 [of the eCommerce Directive] introduces a 
horizontal special liability regime for the three types of service providers covered by it. Provided they 
meet the criteria laid down in Section 4, the service providers will be exempted from contractual 
liability, administrative liability, tortious/extra-contractual liability, penal liability, civil liability or any 
other type of liability, for all types of activities initiated by third parties, including copyright and trade 
mark infringements, defamation, misleading advertising, unfair commercial practices, unfair 
competition, publications of illegal content, etc.”). 
 4 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital Single Market Strategy 
for Europe, COM (2015) 192 final (May 6, 2015), at § 3.3 [hereinafter Digital Single Market Strategy]. 
 5 Id. (citing Jean-Claude Juncker, Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission—A New 
Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change (July 15, 2014)). 
 6 See Priority: Digital Single Market, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http:/ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-
single-market_en [https://perma.cc/G8LU-A5JN] (last visited June 3, 2017). 
 7 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Addressing 
Geo-Blocking and Other Forms of Discrimination Based on Customers’ Nationality, Place of Residence 
or Place of Establishment Within the Internal Market and Amending Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 
and Directive 2009/22/EC, COM (2016) 289 final (May 25, 2016). 
 8 Digital Single Market Strategy, supra note 4, at §§ 2.1–4, 3.3. 
 9 Digital Single Market Strategy, supra note 4, at § 2.4 (emphasis added). 
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dealing with unlawful third-party content.10 These enhanced responsibilities 
would apply when intermediaries deal with illegal content, such as child 
pornography, terrorist materials, and content that infringes upon intellectual 
property rights.11 In particular, the Commission is discussing what 
regulations should apply to a subset of those intermediaries deemed “online 
platforms” and “whether to require intermediaries to exercise greater 
responsibility and due diligence in the way they manage their networks and 
systems—a duty of care.”12 It is worth noting that some European national 
jurisdictions are already in the process of implementing some form of a 
“duty of care.”13 The German coalition agreement, for example, 
emphasized that “internet service providers should take more 
responsibility” for mass copyright infringement.14 Specifically, the German 
coalition plans to “improve enforcement in particular towards platforms 
whose business model is mainly based on the infringement of copyright” 
by ensuring “that such service providers no longer enjoy the general 
liability privilege as so-called hosting provider and in particular no longer 
receive advertising revenues.”15 
The DSMS was followed by a number of other actions to bring 
Europe up to speed in the digital market. Some of these actions are 
especially relevant for intermediary liability. First, the Commission 
released a new Communication, Towards a Modern, More European 
Copyright Framework,16 anticipating that policy and legislative action 
would be taken in respect to: (1) exceptions to digital and cross-borders 
environments;17 (2) exclusive rights, including both clarifying issues facing 
linking to other content and considering whether any action specific to 
 
 10 Id. at §§ 3.3.1–2. 
 11 Id. at § 3.3.2. 
 12 Id. 
 13 See eCommerce Directive, supra note 2, at Recital 48, (establishing that “[t]his Directive does 
not affect the possibility for Member States of requiring service providers, who host information 
provided by recipients of their service, to apply duties of care, which can reasonably be expected from 
them and which are specified by national law, in order to detect and prevent certain types of illegal 
activities”) (emphasis added). 
 14 See Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten – Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, 18 
Legislaturperiode (December 17, 2013), 133–34, http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/
_Anlagen/2013/2013-12-17-koalitionsvertrag.pdf 
 15 Id. at 133. 
 16 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a Modern, 
More European Copyright Framework, COM (2015) 260 final (Dec. 9, 2015). 
 17 Id. at 6–9; see also Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, on 
Ensuring the Cross-Border Portability of Online Content Services in the Internal Market, COM (2015) 
627 final (Dec. 9, 2015). 
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news aggregators is needed;18 and (3) enforcement, including “follow the 
money” strategies, commercial-scale infringements, application of 
provisional and precautionary measures, injunctions and their cross-border 
effect, notice and action mechanisms, and the “take down and stay down” 
principle.19 
Meanwhile, the Commission also launched a “public consultation on 
the evaluation and modernization of the legal framework for the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights.”20 This consultation discusses 
reform within the DSMS that will affect liability of online intermediaries. 
Provisions established by the Enforcement Directive on topics including 
legal action, the right of information, damages and costs, and provisional 
and precautionary measures might soon be revisited.21 In particular, 
injunctions against online intermediaries might be considered in the next 
round of reforms. European law might be amended by explicitly 
establishing that all types of intermediaries can be enjoined and no specific 
intermediaries’ liability or violation of any duty of care would be required 
to issue an injunction.22 Apparently, the Commission might also like to 
clarify or update the European Court of Justice’s position in Telekabel.23 
First, the Commission might introduce criteria for defining the 
proportionality of an injunction.24 Additionally, the Enforcement Directive 
might be amended to “clarif[y] . . . how to balance the effective 
implementation” of enforcement measures and users’ “right to freedom of 
information” in case of a blocking order that does not specify the measures 
that a service provider must take.25 
 
 18 Towards a Modern, More European Copyright Framework, supra note 16, at 9–10. 
 19 Id. at 10–11; see also Annemarie Bridy, Internet Payment Blockades, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1523 
(2015). 
 20 See Public Consultation on the Evaluation and Modernization of the Legal Framework for IPR 
Enforcement: Summary of Responses, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Sept. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Commission]. 
 21 See Corrigendum to Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
April 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16, 16–17 [hereinafter 
Enforcement Directive]. 
 22 See Commission, supra note 20, at 36. 
 23 See Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH and Wega 
Filmproducktionsgesellschaft mbH, 2014 E.C.R. 192 (Mar. 27, 2014) (stating that EU law does not 
preclude a court “injunction [that] does not specify the measures which that access provider must take” 
to block access to a copyright-infringing website). 
 24 See Commission, supra note 20, at 36–37. 
 25 Id. at 36. 
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II. UNCHANGED INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY REGIME? THE DEVIL IS IN THE 
SECTORIAL LEGISLATION AND VOLUNTARY MEASURES 
The Commission also launched a public consultation on the role and 
responsibilities of online intermediaries and platforms.26 The consultation 
raised a number of pointed questions about the intermediary liability 
framework in the EU.27 In particular, Section 3 of the Consultation, 
Tackling Illegal Content Online and the Liability of Online Intermediaries, 
questioned whether the eCommerce Directive’s reference to “mere 
technical, automatic and passive” activity by intermediaries is sufficiently 
clear;28 whether additional categories of intermediaries should be 
established;29 whether particular types of content merit different notice-and-
action procedures;30 whether action should include “take down and stay 
down” or prospective monitoring for flagged content;31 and whether there 
should be imposed specific duties of care for certain intermediaries.32 
“A consensus emerged from the consultation” that the “existing 
liability principles on which the Section IV of the E-Commerce Directive is 
based are fit-for-purpose.”33 Therefore, the Commission published a 
communication, Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market, which 
apparently endorses maintaining the existing intermediary liability 
regime.34 However, this broad programmatic statement might be deceiving. 
As usual, the devil is in the details. The Commission did stress that “a 
number of specific issues relating to illegal and harmful content and 
activities online have been identified that need to be addressed,”35 which 
 
 26 See QUESTIONNAIRE, REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT FOR PLATFORMS, ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES, 
DATA AND CLOUD COMPUTING AND THE COLLABORATIVE ECONOMY, EUROPEAN COMM’N; Public 
Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms, Online Intermediaries, Data and Cloud 
Computing and the Collaborative Economy, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Sept. 24, 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/
digital-single-market/news/public-consultation-regulatory-environment-platforms-online-
intermediaries-data-and-cloud [https://perma.cc/D43H-36ZC]. 
 27 QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 26, at 5. 
 28 Id. at 17, 19; see also eCommerce Directive, supra note 2, at Recital 42. 
 29 QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 26, at 19. 
 30 Id. at 19–21. 
 31 Id. at 20–21. 
 32 Id. at 21–23. 
 33 See Full Report on the Results of the Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for 
Platforms, Online Intermediaries and the Collaborative Economy, EUROPEAN COMM’N (May 25, 
2016), https:/ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/full-report-results-public-consultation-
regulatory-environment-platforms-online-intermediaries [https://perma.cc/5UJ2-RANY]. 
 34 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, and the 
European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, Online Platforms and 
the Digital Single Market: Opportunities and Challenges for Europe, COM (2016) 288 final, at 9 (May 
25, 2016) [hereinafter OP&DSM Communication]. 
 35 Id. at 8. 
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suggests that online intermediaries’ liability relating to certain categories of 
illegal content could be expanded. 
In light of the Commission’s conclusion that the current liability 
regime is generally adequate, but specific problems still need to be 
addressed, the Commission suggested a “sectorial, problem-driven 
approach”36 that implements different policy approaches for different 
categories of illegal content. Apparently, this sectorial action will target 
copyright-protected content, minors’ protection from harmful content, and 
incitement through hatred.37 In other words, according to the Commission, 
intermediary liability should be expanded by imposing an obligation on 
online platforms to behave responsibly by addressing specific content-
related problems. 
The Commission recommends addressing these content-specific issues 
with a mix of legislative interventions—by updating the audio-visual and 
copyright regulations—and voluntary self-regulatory actions.38 The 
Commission specifically encouraged immediate self-regulatory efforts by 
online intermediaries that are designed to fight incitement to terrorism and 
prevent hate speech.39 The OP&DSM Communication puts forward the idea 
that the responsibility of online platforms is “wid[ening]” and has become a 
key, cross-cutting issue.40 In doing so, the Commission has endorsed a 
strategy that shifts the policy approach from intermediary liability to 
intermediary responsibility, with special emphasis on voluntary measures 
from intermediaries to curb undesired conduct—and speech—online. As an 
immediate result of this new policy trend, the Commission recently agreed 
with all major online hosting providers—including Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube, and Microsoft—on a “code of conduct that includes a series of 
commitments to combat the spread of illegal hate speech online in 
Europe.”41 Apparently, the Commission aligns its strategy for online 
platforms to a globalized, ongoing movement towards privatization of law 
enforcement online through algorithmic tools.42 
 
 36 See id. at 9. 
 37 Id. at 8–9. 
 38 Id. at 9. 
 39 Id. at 8–9. 
 40 Id. at 7–9. 
 41 See European Commission Press Release IP/16/1937, European Commission and IT Companies 
Announce Code of Conduct on Illegal Online Hate Speech (May 31, 2016); Fighting Illegal Online 
Hate Speech: First Assessment of the New Code of Conduct, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Dec. 6, 2016), 
ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=50840 (urging platforms to do more to implement 
the code of conduct) [https://perma.cc/Y6AM-SP9L]. 
 42 See Joe McNamee, Leaked EU Communication—Part 1: Privatized Censorship and 
Surveillance, EDRI (Apr. 27, 2016), https://edri.org/leaked-eu-communication-privatised-censorship-
and-surveillance [https://perma.cc/UFV8-Q4RB]. 
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Despite their focus on voluntary intermediary self-regulation, the 
Commission’s proposals do include an important role for legislative 
intervention. In particular, the Commission proposes updating the Audio-
Visual Media Services Directive to address the proliferation of hate speech 
and content that is harmful to minors on online video sharing 
platforms.43This sector-specific regulation would require platforms to put in 
place measures to protect minors from harmful content and to protect 
everyone from incitement to hatred.44 Commentators have been concerned 
that the AVMS revision might erode the eCommerce Directive “no 
monitoring obligations” for video platforms—especially if the “harmful” 
content category is to be interpreted more broadly than “illegal” content.45 
Therefore, the AVMS Draft revision also represents an expansion of 
intermediary liability. 
III.  COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET: CLOSING THE VALUE 
GAP? 
The Communication also suggested promoting a fairer allocation of 
value generated by the distribution of copyright-protected content online.46 
The Commission presented its suggestion for a platform-sensitive update of 
EU copyright policy in a proposal for a directive on copyright in the Digital 
Single Market.47 This draft directive is part of a larger package aimed at 
modernizing EU copyright rules and achieving a fully functioning Digital 
Single Market. 
The draft directive aims, inter alia, to close the so-called “value gap” 
between internet platforms and copyright holders. The idea of a “value 
gap” echoes a discourse almost exclusively fabricated by the music and 
entertainment industry. Apparently, this rhetorical device was coined for 
 
 43 See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 
2010/13/EU on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation or 
Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Provision of Audiovisual Media Services in 
View of Changing Market Realities, COM (2016) 287 final (May 25, 2016) [hereinafter AVMS Draft] 
(discussing these issues broadly in the “Explanatory Memorandum”). 
 44 Id. at Art. 6 & 28. 
 45 See Daphne Keller, Can a New Broadcasting Law in Europe Make Internet Host Monitor Their 
Users?, CIS BLOG (May 27, 2016, 2:51 PM), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2016/05/can-new-
broadcasting-law-europe-make-internet-hosts-monitor-their-users [https://perma.cc/8H3H-EWRK]; see 
also AVMS Draft, supra note 43, at Art. 6 
 46  OP&DSM Communication, supra note 34, at 8 (emphasis added). 
 47 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept. 14, 2016), 1, Art. 13 [hereinafter DSM Directive 
Proposal]. 
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the first time in music industry global reports.48 After unsuccessful attempts 
to seek judicial redress against user-generated content platforms (“UGC 
platforms”),49 the industry decided to plead its case before the legislators 
and seek legislative reform.50 Rightholders complained that the law—
specifically liability exemptions for UGC platforms, the lack of monitoring 
obligations, and the notice and take-down regime—left them with no 
ability to monetize the exchange of protected content on UGC platforms. 
Rightholders suggested that, rather than entering into licensing agreements, 
UGC platforms should offer to remove infringing content upon notice or 
possibly implement voluntary measures like YouTube’s Content ID.51 As a 
result, other platforms whose primary business is to sell content to users—
and therefore do not qualify for liability exemptions and must license 
copyrights from rightholders—would be willing to pay less in licensing 
fees in order to remain competitive with UGC platforms. Recently, the 
same rhetoric has been redeployed in the United States. In an open letter to 
President-elect Donald Trump, the music industry sought reform of safe 
harbor legislation, pointing out that high-tech companies have thrived on 
free music and the “value grab.”52 
There are two major problems with this “value-grab” rhetoric. First, it 
echoes an overexploited narrative identifying the internet as a digital threat 
rather than a digital opportunity.53 These narratives undervalue the 
opportunities that the internet, digitization, and sharing economies provide 
for creators. The other major problem with this rhetoric is that it is scarcely 
supported by empirical evidence. The Draft Directive’s Impact Assessment 
admits this by noting that “economic impacts are mostly assessed from a 
qualitative point of view” and that no quantitative analysis of the impacts 
 
 48 See Martin Husovec, EC Proposes Stay-down & Expanded Obligation to License UGC Services, 
HUT’KO’S TECH. LAW BLOG, (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.husovec.eu/2016/09/ec-proposes-stay-down-
expanded.html [https://perma.cc/CYG5-LZF9]. 
 49 See, e.g., Rechtsprechung der Oberlandesgericht in München [OLG] [Higher Regional Court], 
29 U 2798/15 Jan. 28, 2016 (Ger.) (ruling against GEMA, a performers’ rights organization in 
Germany, in holding that YouTube could not be held liable for damages for hosting copyrighted content 
without the copyright holder’s permission). 
 50 See, e.g., Press Release, GEMA, EU Copyright Modernisation: First Steps Towards a Fair and 
Balanced Relationship Between Authors & Online Platforms (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.gema.de/
en/aktuelles/eu_urheberrechtsreform_erste_schritte_zu_einem_fairen_ausgleich_zwischen_urhebern_un
d_online_plattf [https://perma.cc/5K8H-LFBR]. 
 51 See How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE HELP, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/
2797370?hl=en [https://perma.cc/AJ5P-RJZF] (last visited June 5, 2017). 
 52 See Letter from Am. Ass’n of Indep. Music et al. to Donald J. Trump, President-Elect of the 
United States (Dec.13, 2016) http://www.riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Letter-to-POTUSE-
from-Music-Community-121316.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6EM-597U]. 
 53 See JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 54–82 (Yale 
University Press 2008). 
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of the different policy options was undertaken because of “[t]he limited 
availability of data in this area.”54 The European Copyright Society 
reinforced this point by stating that they “are disappointed to see that the 
proposals are not grounded in any solid scientific (in particular, economic) 
evidence.”55 In reality, there is no clear evidence on the scale, nature, or 
effects of copyright infringement in the digital environment, or the 
effectiveness of more aggressive enforcement strategies. In an authoritative 
report commissioned by the UK government, Professor Ian Hargreaves 
noted the major problem with this lack of empirical evidence: that 
copyright policies should be based on hard and transparent evidence, and 
so far none has been provided.56 
Professor Hargreaves is correct: in crafting the European Digital 
Single Market Strategy, clear empirical evidence should have been 
carefully reviewed to consider whether creators and the creative market as 
a whole have been withering or flourishing. So far, independent empirical 
evidence supporting the present enforcement strategy has never been 
provided. Also never considered was contrary evidence that might 
emphasize positive externalities for creativity of the internet, digitization, 
and platform economy. This contrary evidence is plentiful. The literature 
has consistently shown that, in reality, the digital platform economy has 
created value for content providers, not a value gap that needs to be 
closed.57 Empirical studies have shown that in the digital environment, “the 
sky is rising,” rather than falling, as far as creative industries are 
concerned.58 Piracy has forced the market to adapt to user needs,59 and the 
market has in fact adapted by offering new and more affordable ways to 
 
 54 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment on the 
Modernisation of EU Copyright Rules, 136, SWD (2016) 301 final PART 1/3 (Sept. 14, 2016). 
 55 European Copyright Society, General Opinion on the EU Copyright Reform Package (January 
24, 2017), 5, https://europeancopyrightsocietydotorg.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/ecs-opinion-on-eu-
copyright-reform-def.pdf. 
 56 See IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
GROWTH 10 (2011) (emphasis added); see also Joe Karaganis, Rethinking Piracy, in MEDIA PIRACY IN 
EMERGING ECONOMIES 4, 4–11 (Joe Karaganis ed., 2011) (making the same point). 
 57 See Giancarlo F. Frosio, Digital Piracy Debunked: A Short Note on Digital Threats and 
Intermediary Liability, INTERNET POL’Y REV., Mar. 2016, at 1-22 (discussing in details the empirical 
studies cited below). 
 58 See MICHAEL MASNICK AND MICHAEL HO, FLOOR 64, THE SKY IS RISING: A DETAILED LOOK 
AT THE STATE OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 3 (2012); see also Joel Waldfogel, Is the Sky 
Falling? The Quality of New Recorded Music Since Napster, VOX (Nov. 14, 2011), 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/ 7274 [https://perma.cc/2HJU-LW56]. 
 59 See generally ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG 
TO GATES (U. of Chicago Press 2009). 
112:251 (2017) Reforming Intermediary Liability in the Platform Economy 
29 
enjoy creativity.60 This narrative, and empirical economic studies that 
support it, are nowhere to be found in the impact assessment justifying the 
draft directive or in the larger institutional debate surrounding it. 
A. Ancillary Rights for Publishers 
A groundbreaking provision aimed at closing the value gap—and 
affecting directly online intermediaries—is the introduction of a 
neighboring right for press publishers for the digital uses of their 
publication.61 This new sui generis right would last for twenty years from 
the date of the publication.62 It would also apply retroactively to press 
publications already published.63 
Allegedly, the introduction of this neighboring right for press 
publishers is based on the assumption that “[i]n the transition from print to 
digital, publishers of press publications are facing problems in licensing the 
online use of their publications and recouping their investments.”64 
According to the Impact Assessment, without this right, press publishers 
would curb their investment in the digital press publishing market due to 
complex and inefficient licensing and enforcement in the digital 
environment.65 However, the Impact Assessment does not provide any 
evidence to support this conclusion.66 Also, in advance of the Directive 
proposal, several leading European scholars have already advised against 
the introduction of any neighboring rights for publishers, making 
arguments based on empirical effects on market efficiency.67 To put it 
 
 60 See CREATE COPYRIGHT RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. OF GLASGOW, Copyright Evidence, 
COPYRIGHT EVIDENCE WIKI (Nov. 14, 2016, 2:33 PM), http://www.copyrightevidence.org 
[https://perma.cc/KPG9-NFB8] (trying to establish a body of evidence that allows better decision-
making in the contested copyright policy field). 
 61 See DSM Directive Proposal, supra note 47, Art. 11 (providing “publishers of press publications 
with the rights” of reproduction and making them available to the public “for the digital use of their 
press publications”). 
 62 Id. Neighboring rights—or related rights—are characterized by the fact that they are created for 
rightholders’ categories that are not technically authors and might share only some of the requirements 
of traditional copyright and have a different scope of protection. 
 63 DSM Directive Proposal, supra note 47, Art. 18. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment on the Modernisation of EU 
Copyright Rules, at 175–92, SWD (2016) 301 final, PART 3/3 (Sept. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Impact 
Assessment]; DSM Directive Proposal, supra note 47, at 18–19. 
 66 See Impact Assessment, supra note 65, at 175–92. 
 67 See Martin Kretschmer, Séverine Dusollier, Christophe Geiger & P. Bernt Hugenholtz, The 
European Commission’s Public Consultation on the Role of Publishers in the Copyright Value Chain: 
A Response by the European Copyright Society, 38 EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. REV. 591, 591–
595 (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2801595 [https://perma.cc/63QB-
SH3D]; RETO M. HILTY, KAYA KÖKLÜ & VALENTINA MOSCON, POSITION STATEMENT OF THE MAX 
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bluntly, the causality between the demise of traditional press publishing 
and the growth of new information society services, such as online news 
aggregators—and hence the need for granting new neighboring rights—
was never shown.68 Apparently, this reform is also based on a marketing-
driven, industry-led narrative, rather than empirical evidence showing a 
causal link between inefficiencies in the market and the legal instruments 
proposed. 
This proposal follows in the footsteps of press publishers’ rights 
created by a limited number of Member States. Similar arrangements 
enacted in Spain and Germany already stirred up quite a debate.69 Empirical 
evidence collected after the enactment of these neighboring rights showed 
that the reforms were ineffective and altogether detrimental. In Germany, 
the law did not achieve the desired results.70 Actually, German press 
publishers authorized Google to index their publications and feature them 
in Google’s news and search services free of charge.71 Some smaller news 
aggregation services operating in Germany delisted press publishers or 
stopped using snippets.72 In Spain, the adoption of the law also led to 
unexpected results.73 First, Google shut down its Spanish Google News 
service. In addition, recent empirical evidence confirmed that news 
aggregators had a positive effect on online news sites in Spain, which 
 
PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITION ON THE “PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE 
ROLE OF PUBLISHERS IN THE COPYRIGHT VALUE CHAIN” (2016), http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/
pubman/item/escidoc:2321286:3/component/escidoc:2436801/MPI_Position_statement_15_6_2016_de
f.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJ3W-UY9S]; Eleonora Rosati, Neighbouring Rights for Publishers: Are 
National and (Possible) EU Initiatives Lawful?, 47 INT’L REV. INTELLECTUAL PROP. & COMPETITION 
L. 569, 571, 585 (2016); Alexander Peukert, An EU Related Right for Press Publishers Concerning 
Digital Uses. A Legal Analysis §§ 5-13 (Goethe Univ. Frankfurt am Main Research Paper No. 22/2016, 
2016), https://www.eco.de/wp-content/blogs.dir/copyright_-legal-analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/RL5J-
9RQM]. 
 68 See Susana Navas Navarro, Periódicos Digitales y Agregadores de Contenido Informativo en 
España [Digital Newspapers and Aggregators of News Content in Spain], 246 Revue Internationale du 
Droit d’Auteur 72, 120–25 (2015). 
 69 See Christophe Geiger, Oleksandr Bulayenko & Giancarlo Frosio, Opinion of the CEIPI on the 
European Commission’s Copyright Reform Proposal with a Focus on the Introduction of Neighbouring 
Rights for Press Publishers in EU Law 5–8 (Ctr. for Int’l Intellectual Prop. Stud. Research Paper No. 
2016-01, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2921334 [https://perma.cc/UXN2-
NWLV] (reviewing these national legislations). 
 70 See Andreas Becker, German Publishers Vs. Google, DEUTSCHE WELLE, (Oct. 30, 2014), 
http://www.dw.com/en/german-publishers-vs-google/a-18030444 [https://perma.cc/K2QA-F6LN]; 
Raquel Xalabarder, Press Publisher Rights in the New Copyright in the Digital Single Market Draft 
Directive 16–17 (Ctr. for Copyright & New Bus. Models Creative Econ. Working Paper 2016/15, 
2016), http://www.create.ac.uk/publications/press-publisher-rights-in-the-new-copyright-in-the-digital-
single-market-draft-directive/ [https://perma.cc/P85B-M2QQ]. 
 71 Id. 
 72 See Kretschmer, Dusollier, Geiger & Hugenholtz, supra note 67, at 594. 
 73 See Xalabarder, supra note 70, at 17–21. 
112:251 (2017) Reforming Intermediary Liability in the Platform Economy 
31 
directly contradicts the predictions in the Impact Assessment and the 
Directive Proposal.74 The study found that in the first three months of 2015, 
the closing of Google News and a number of smaller news aggregation 
services led to a decline of more than six percent of internet traffic to 
Spanish newspapers.75 Because news aggregators have a “market expansion 
effect,”76 the closing of the news aggregators particularly hurt small 
publications by decreasing the number of new visitors to their sites.77 It also 
created barriers to innovation for other information intermediaries that 
compile customized services based on users’ online activities or aggregate 
content for mobile phones, as well as algorithmic aggregators designed to 
deliver dynamic content.78 
These findings show troubling potential negative externalities of the 
reform, especially in terms of access to information (and therefore 
democratization) and innovation policy. First, the proposal might 
negatively impact smaller publishers, and therefore promote a 
recentralization of online news outlets. This would detract from the 
diversity of information on the internet, limit users’ access to information, 
and hinder democratization.79 The literature explaining why centralization 
hinders democratization is plentiful.80 As Jerome Barron argued, a 
democratic system should aim to decentralize information.81 In general, 
concentrated systems are likely to exclude challenges to prevailing 
wisdom82 and translate unequal distribution of economic power into 
 
 74 See Pedro Posada de la Concha, Alberto Gutiérrez García & Hugo Hernández Cobos, NERA 
ECON. CONSULTING, IMPACTO DEL NUEVO ARTÍCULO 32.2 DE LA LEY DE PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL: 
INFORME PARA LA ASOCIACIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE EDITORIALES DE PUBLICACIONES PERIÓDICAS (AEEPP) 
[IMPACT OF THE NEW ARTICLE 32.2 OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: STUDY FOR THE SPANISH 
ASSOCIATION OF PUBLISHERS OF PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS], at xiii (2015), http://www.aeepp.com/
pdf/InformeNera.pdf [https://perma.cc/BH2L-XHV3]. 
 75 Id. at xii. 
 76 The phrase “market expansion effect” refers to the ability of news aggregators to drive visitors to 
news websites who would otherwise not have visited those websites. Id. at x. 
 77 Id. at xiv. 
 78 Id. at xii. 
 79 See Peukert, supra note 67, at §§ 186–94. 
 80 See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 
1641 (1967) [hereinafter Barron, Access to the Press]; Jerome A. Barron, Access—The Only Choice for 
the Media?, 48 TEX. L. REV. 766 (1970) [hereinafter Barron, The Only Choice]; see also Neil 
Weinstock Netanel, New Media in Old Bottles? Barron’s Contextual First Amendment and Copyright 
in the Digital Age, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 952 (2008); Yochai Benkler, A Speakers’ Corner Under the 
Sun, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 291 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel 
eds., 2002). 
 81 See Barron, The Only Choice, supra note 80. 
 82 See Barron, Access to the Press, supra note 80, at 1641–47. 
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unequal distribution of power to express ideas.83 Media concentration 
creates disparities in the ability to be heard.84 A study on the state of the 
implementation of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions85 in Europe noted that, 
while some copyright is necessary, too much copyright is detrimental to 
diversity of cultural expression.86 Diversity of cultural expression is 
particularly threatened by intellectual property rights “in markets that are 
dominated by big corporations exercising collective power as 
oligopolies.”87 This process of concentration endangers cultural diversity in 
that “a handful—six to ten vertically integrated communications 
companies—will soon produce, own, and distribute the bulk of the culture 
and information circulating in the global marketplace.”88 
Second, the creation of new neighboring rights enjoying retroactive 
effects would remove material from the public domain and consequently 
impinge freedom of expression and democratization.89 The enclosure of the 
public domain enhances centralized media’s market power, while 
proportionally disincentivizing decentralization. The public domain is a 
metaphysical public forum that “belong[s] to everyone, because [it] 
belong[s] to no one, from which people cannot be excluded on the grounds 
that a property owner wishes to exclude them.”90 Thus, “[t]he public 
 
 83 See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1412–13 (1986); 
J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 404–12 (1990). 
 84 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 362 
(1996); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression, 
53 VAND. L. REV. 1879, 1879–82 (2000); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and ‘Market Power’ in 
the Marketplace of Ideas, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT 149, 160–62 (François Lévêque & 
Howard Shelanski eds., 2005); see also Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Democracy: A Cautionary 
Note, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1933 (2000). 
 85 See U.N. EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG., CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION 
OF THE DIVERSITY OF CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS (2005). 
 86 GERMANN AVOCATS, IMPLEMENTING THE UNESCO CONVENTION OF 2005 IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 26, 76–78 (2010), http://www.diversitystudy.eu/ms/ep_study_long_version_20_nov_2010_
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4BS-H38Y] (study prepared for the European Parliament). 
 87 Id. at 26. 
 88 RONALD V. BETTIG, COPYRIGHTING CULTURE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 38 (1996). 
 89 For a discussion of the negative effects of the enclosure of the public domain for European 
citizens, see GIANCARLO F. FROSIO, COMMUNIA, COMMUNIA FINAL REPORT (2011), 
http://nexa.polito.it/nexacenterfiles/D1.11-COMMUNIA%20Final%20Report-nov2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KS3U-99HC] (report prepared for the European Commission on behalf of the 
COMMUNIA Network and the NEXA Center); see also Xalabarder, supra note 70, at 22–24 (noting 
that this proposal completely upsets the dichotomy between unprotected information and protected 
expressions embedded in copyright law). 
 90 Rebecca Tushnet, Domain and Forum: Public Space, Public Freedom, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
597, 598 (2007). 
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domain represents our free speech concerns within the realm of copyright 
law.”91 Consequently, any increase or decrease in the public domain will 
proportionally affect our freedom of speech. 
In addition, the public domain promotes rich and diverse expressions 
regardless of the market power of the speakers, as there are no costs 
inherent in utilizing the public domain. Any decrease in the public domain 
will produce the most direct repercussions on people with less ability to 
finance the dissemination of their speech. Copyright expansion favors 
organizations that own large information inventories over smaller 
organizations and individuals who will have to buy access to the 
information that is removed from the public domain.92 Thus, any 
contraction of the public domain will work against the goal of bringing “the 
millions of dispossessed and disadvantaged . . . in from the margins of 
society, and cultural policy in from the margins of governance.”93 
These consequences are especially likely to follow from the removal 
of information from the online public marketplace, as the internet is “a 
driver of greater pluralism in the media, giving both access to a wider range 
of sources and points of view as well as the means for individuals—who 
might otherwise be denied the opportunity—to express themselves fully 
and openly.”94 The internet changed freedom of expression’s focus from the 
right of a few privileged speakers to address the masses to the right of each 
person to participate in a “democratic culture.”95 
Third, introducing neighboring rights for press publishers would act as 
a strong disincentive for innovators, as it would back up property owners’ 
attempts to leverage their holdout power to block progress. Anticompetitive 
behaviors are common in this context, and property owners repeatedly try 
 
 91 Michael D. Birnhack, More or Better? Shaping the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE 
PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 59, 62 (Lucie Guibault & P. 
Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006); see also Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First 
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 393 (1999). 
 92 Yochai Benkler, A Political Economy of the Public Domain: Markets in Information Goods vs. 
The Marketplace of Ideas, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION 
POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 267, 273–74 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diane Leenheer 
Zimmerman & Harry First eds., 2001). 
 93 EUROPEAN TASK FORCE ON CULTURE & DEV., IN FROM THE MARGINS: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE 
DEBATE ON CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE 7 (1997) (report prepared for the Council of 
Europe). 
 94 Commission Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions: A Digital Agenda for 
Europe, at 30, COM (2010) 245 final (May 19, 2010). 
 95 See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2004) (arguing that digital technologies 
should change the focus of free speech theory from a concern for protecting democratic process to a 
larger concern promoting and protecting a democratic culture). 
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to leverage their holdout power. This behavior applies to property at large,96 
but it surfaced often throughout the history of copyright in particular.97 This 
time, innovators will be disincentivized from developing technologies that 
compile and aggregate content on the internet. 
Finally, an additional point should be stressed in connection with the 
overall scope of this reform process. Ancillary rights to press publication 
for online uses would delay, rather than promote, the Digital Single 
Market. The introduction of an additional layer of twenty-eight national 
rights would certainly lead to further challenges related to fragmentation 
and territoriality of rights.98 In addition, as there is already no uniform 
approach to exceptions or limitations to twenty-eight national authors’ 
rights—which has led to considerable uncertainty in that area of the law—
allowing the creation of twenty-eight additional national rights for 
publishers would have the same result, which is exactly what the Digital 
Single Market is designed to avoid.99 
B. Platforms’ Revenue-Share Agreements and Filtering 
The proposed reform also includes a second provision that would 
impact platform operations broadly. It requires intermediaries “that store 
and provide to the public access to large amounts of works . . . uploaded by 
their users” to take appropriate and proportionate “measures to [either] 
ensure the functioning of agreements concluded with rightholders for the 
use of their works” or “prevent the availability on their services of [such] 
works,” including through “the use of effective content recognition 
technologies.”100 Put bluntly, under this provision, UGC platforms would 
have to shoulder more responsibility for rooting out infringements and 
share revenues with creators. 
The scope of the provision is still to be determined. In particular, 
Recital 38(1-2) of the proposal—read together with Article 13—might 
cause some interpretive headaches.101 Apparently, the new proposal would 
 
 96 See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 749–50, 752 (1986) (discussing how large public projects such as 
highways or railroads are vulnerable to the holdout power of single property owners). 
 97 See Hannibal Travis, Building Universal Digital Libraries: An Agenda for Copyright Reform, 
33 PEPP. L. REV. 761, 786–92 (2006) (sketching a quick history of holdouts on cultural technological 
advancements); see also Giancarlo F. Frosio, Google Books Rejected: Taking the Orphans to the 
Digital Public Library of Alexandria, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 81, 128–130 
(2011) (reviewing the relevant case law). 
 98 See Geiger, Bulayenko & Frosio, supra note 69, at 8. 
 99 Id., at 9–10. 
 100 DSM Directive Proposal, supra note 47, at Art. 13, cl. 1. 
 101 Id., at 1–5. 
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apply to active hosting providers. The proposal refers only to those who 
“store and provide access” to protected works, which restricts the 
proposal’s scope to hosting providers.102 If a hosting provider is not eligible 
for the liability exemption established by Article 14 of the eCommerce 
Directive, it is obliged to enter into licensing agreements with 
rightholders.103 For the Article 14 exemption not to apply, a hosting 
provider must “play an active role.”104 In defining a hosting provider that 
plays an active role, Recital 38 of the proposal states that it must go 
“beyond the mere provision of physical facilities.”105 Redeploying the 
language from L’Oréal v. eBay, the proposal notes that playing an active 
role “includ[es] . . . optimising the presentation of the uploaded works or 
subject-matter or promoting them, irrespective of the nature of the means 
used therefor.”106 By referring to L’Oréal, the proposal might also imply 
that a hosting provider can still be protected even if it is not completely 
passive as long as it does not have knowledge or control over the data 
being stored.107 Therefore, it is unclear whether sharing platforms like 
YouTube, Dailymotion, or Soundcloud qualify as an active host under the 
proposal.108 
There are also several textual issues with this proposal that would 
need clarification—especially the notion of “large amounts” of works 
whose scope of application becomes impossible to determine.109 However, 
there is one aspect of the debate surrounding the proposal that has become 
increasingly sensitive, especially due to recent activism of the CJEU that 
might be aligning its jurisprudence to the positions held by the Commission 
in the DSM Draft Directive. Apparently, the proposal implies that hosting 
providers that do not just merely provide physical facilities, and “thereby” 
perform an act of communication to the public.110 The Commission has 
reinforced this statement elsewhere. The Communication on Online 
 
 102 Id. at 20 (emphasis added). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id.; see also Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-06011, I-06119, ¶ 
116. 
 107 See L’Oréal, 2011 E.C.R. I-06119, ¶¶ 112–16; see also Van Eecke, supra note 3, at 1472–74 
(supporting a “storage but no knowledge” test). 
 108 See Eleonora Rosati, Why a Reform of Hosting Providers’ Safe Harbour is Unnecessary under 
EU Copyright Law (CREATe Working Paper 2016/11, August 2016). 
 109 For a full discussion of these textual issues and an in-depth analysis of the proposal, see 
Giancarlo Frosio & Christophe Geiger, Reaction of CEIPI to the European Commission’s Proposal on 
Certain Uses of Protected Content by Online Services (Ctr. for Int’l Intellectual Prop. Studies Position 
Paper) (forthcoming 2017) (on file with the author). 
 110 Id. 
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Platforms and the Digital Single Market noted that rebalancing is needed 
because “[n]ew forms of online content distribution have emerged that may 
make copyright-protected content uploaded by end-users widely 
available.111 The Commission characterizes platforms as actively “making 
available” content uploaded by end-users and considers doing so an act of 
communication to the public. The reasons for this characterization are quite 
apparent. If platforms communicate to the public, they would be potentially 
liable for copyright infringement. Therefore, providers can be obliged to 
enter into licensing agreements, rather than enter monetization agreements 
on a voluntary basis. 
However, characterizing hosting providers as “communicating to the 
public” has never been an obvious conclusion under EU law. First, the 
apparent implication that, unless liability exemptions apply, intermediaries 
storing and providing public access to protected works would be 
communicating to the public is novel. Actually, there is no direct relation 
between liability and exemptions, which function as an extra layer of 
protection intended to harmonize at the EU level conditions to limit 
intermediary liability.112 The inapplicability of the exemptions does not 
imply as such that online intermediaries would be liable. 
In addition, the proposal, by characterizing active hosts as 
communicating to the public, would make them directly liable, rather than 
secondarily liable as commonly understood. According to the European 
Court of Justice, communicating to the public requires that the user must—
in full knowledge of the consequences of its actions—give access to the 
protected work to an additional public so that, absent that indispensable 
intervention, that “new” public is unable to enjoy the work.113 As end-users 
physically upload the work—while online intermediaries do not—they first 
become that necessary indispensable intervention enabling the new public 
to enjoy the protected work. However, recent CJEU case law has been 
transitioning to an apparently looser standard, focusing on the essential, 
rather than the indispensable, role of the user.114 This, in turn, would make 
it easier to construe hosting providers as communicating to the public. 
 
 111 See OP&DSM Communication, supra note 34, at 8 (emphasis added). 
 112 See Frosio & Geiger, supra note 109. 
 113 See Case C-306/05, Sociedad General de Autores v. Rafael Hoteles SA, 2006 E.C.R. I-11519, I-
11558; Joined Cases C-403 & 429/08, Football Assoc. Premier League v. QC Leisure, 2011 E.C.R. I-
9083, I-9239. 
 114 See Case C-527/15, Stiching Brein v. Jack Frederik Wullems, ECLI:EU:C:2017:300, ¶ 32 
(finding communication to the public in the sale of a multimedia player with pre-installed add-ons, 
available on the internet, containing hyperlinks to freely accessible website that makes infringing 
materials available); Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV, XS4ALL Internet BV, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:456, ¶ 37. 
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Recent CJEU case law qualified this notion of essential intervention by 
extending it to circumstances not only where, absent that intervention, 
customers would not be able to access the work, but also where they 
“would be able to do so only with difficulty.”115 In particular, Ziggo, 
discussed below, concludes that without the operators of the platform 
ThePirateBay (TPB) making the platform available and managing it, the 
users could not share the works or, “at the very least, sharing them on the 
internet would prove to be more complex.”116 
Actually, intermediaries have already been held directly liable for 
their users’ copyright infringement, but only when their involvement in the 
infringement is so substantial that they have been found to have 
communicated the works themselves, rather than being used by others to 
perform the communication.117 This line of argument might still distinguish 
Ziggo—and Wullems—from cases involving UGC platforms targeted by 
the upcoming reform. In Ziggo, the TPB provided a vast array of 
functions—such as indexing, categorization, deletion and filtering—that 
obviously set the platform apart from any mere provision of physical 
facilities and trespass into a conduct intentionally aimed at facilitating 
infringement.118 In both cases, the CJEU found a specific design to induce 
copyright infringement, including advertisement or operators’ comments 
on blogs and forums encouraging users to access and download infringing 
content.119 It found that both technologies were primarily designed to 
infringe copyright, considering, for example, that almost the totality of files 
shared on the TPB platform infringe copyright.120 Absent all these 
cumulative circumstances—such as might be the case for UGC sharing 
 
 115 See C-610/15, supra note 114, at ¶ 26. 
 116 Id. at ¶ 36. 
 117 Standards have varied greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, in the UK, there is 
clear distinction between primary and secondary infringement, setting a high bar for finding 
intermediaries directly liable. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Newzbin 
Ltd. [2010] EWHC (Ch) 608, http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2010/608.html 
[https://perma.cc/NQU6-XQBU] (finding an indexing website directly liable for having communicated 
works to the public because it had “intervened in a highly material way to make the claimants’ films 
available to a new audience, that is to say its premium members,” in particular “by providing a 
sophisticated technical and editorial system which allows its premium members to download all the 
component messages of the film of their choice upon pressing a button, and so avoid days of 
(potentially futile) effort in seeking to gather those messages together for themselves”); Football Assoc. 
Premier League Ltd. v. British Sky Broad. Ltd. [2013] EWHC (Ch) 205, 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2013/2058.html [https://perma.cc/HC6F-95EP]. 
 118 See C-610/15, supra note 114, at ¶ 38. 
 119 See C-527/15, supra note 114, at ¶ 18 and 50; C-610/15, supra note 114, at ¶ 45. Cf. MGM 
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 120 See CJEU, C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV, XS4ALL Internet BV (Opinion of Advocate 
General Szpunar), ECLI:EU:C:2017:99, ¶ 23. 
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platforms like YouTube, DailyMotion or Soundcloud—traditionally, 
intermediaries have been held secondarily liable, rather than primarily. In 
most EU jurisdictions, secondary liability requires highly demanding 
conditions that are derived from miscellaneous doctrines of tort law,121 such 
as the doctrines of joint tortfeasance, authorization, inducement, common 
design, contributory liability, vicarious liability, or extra-contractual 
liability.122 In contrast, according to the proposal, intermediary services 
would automatically be assumed to be infringing and directly liable for 
infringements materially committed by others. Although recent CJEU case 
law reinforces the position upheld by the proposal,123 it still might be over-
inclusive and stretch “communication to the public” too far. The broad 
application of “communication to the public” sought by the Commission’s 
proposal would wind the clock back to the debates in the 1990s, when the 
introduction of safe harbor provisions for online intermediaries won the 
day by a narrow margin over initial proposals that held intermediaries fully 
liable for copyright infringement.124 
The proposal encourages the use of effective content recognition 
technologies, such as YouTube’s Content ID or other automatic 
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345–53 (2010). 
 123 See Eleonora Rosati, The CJEU Pirate Bay Judgment and its Impact on the Liability of Online 
Platforms, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. (forthcoming, 2017), 1, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3006591 [https://perma.cc/AJ46-TNMC] (noting that “[i]n relation to the 
current EU policy discussion of the so called ‘value gap proposal’, the judgment reinforces the position 
of the European Commission, especially the basic idea that the making available, by a hosting provider, 
of third-party uploaded copyright content may fall within the scope of the right of communication to the 
public”). 
 124 See BRUCE A. LEHMAN, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 114–24 (1995), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/
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infringement assessment systems, to prevent the availability of infringing 
content. In practice, the proposal would de facto force intermediaries to 
develop and deploy monitoring and filtering systems. This proposal follows 
in the footsteps of a well-established path in recent intermediary liability 
policy. Recent case law has imposed proactive monitor obligations on 
intermediaries for copyright infringement—such as Allostreaming in 
France, Dafra in Brazil, RapidShare in Germany, or Baidu in China.125 
Actually, the emerging enforcement of proactive monitoring obligations 
has been spanning the entire spectrum of intermediary liability subject 
matters: intellectual property, privacy, defamation, and hate/dangerous 
speech.126 In this context, however, notable exceptions—such as the 
landmark Belen case in Argentina—also highlight a fragmented 
international response to intermediary liability.127 There might be a well-
marked trend in intermediary liability policy leading to the death of “no 
monitoring obligations.”128 Current internet policy—especially in Europe—
is silently drifting away from a fundamental safeguard for users’ freedom 
of expression online that has guarded against any “invisible handshake” 
between rightholders, online intermediaries, and governments. 
 
 125 See APC v. Google, Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] 
Paris, Nov. 28, 2013 (Fr.), https://www.legalis.net/jurisprudences/tribunal-de-grande-instance-de-paris-
ordonnance-de-refere-28-novembre-2013/ [https://perma.cc/7JA2-37PB]; Nord-Ouest Prod. v. S.A. 
DailyMotion, Tribunal de grade instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, July 13, 
2007 (Fr.), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=
JURITEXT000018861366&fastReqId=728956270&fastPos=2 [https://perma.cc/JX6L-45GZ], rev’d, 
Christian C. v. DailyMotion, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1 civ., Feb. 
17, 2011, No. 09-67.896 (Fr.), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=
rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000023607266&fastReqId=1284420829&fastPos=1 
[https://perma.cc/UZN4-YLL8}; Google Brazil v. Dafra, S.T.J.J., Special Ap. No. 1.306.157-SP, 
24.03.2014 (Braz.), https://ww2.stj.jus.br/processo/revista/documento/mediado/?componente=
ITA&sequencial=1170944&num_registro=201102315501&data=20140324&formato=PDF 
[https://perma.cc/MQ9V-CXJC]; GEMA v. RapidShare, [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 26, 
2015, I ZR 03/14 (Ger.), http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?
Gericht=bgh&Art=pm&pm_nummer=0194/15 [https://perma.cc/C32U-3GNX]; Zhong Qin Wen v. 
Baidu, 2014 Gao Min Zhong Zi, No. 2045 (Beijing Higher People’s Court 2014). 
 126 See Google v. Mosley (TGI Paris, November 6, 2013) (France); Mosley v Google [2015] 
EWHC 59 (QB) (United Kingdom); Rolex v. eBay/Ricardo, supra note 125; Rolex v. eBay (a.k.a. 
Internetversteigerung II), I ZR 35/04 (BGH, April 19, 2007) (Germany); Rolex v. Ricardo (a.k.a. 
Internetversteigerung III), Case I ZR 73/05, (BGH, April 30, 2008) (Germany); Delfi AS v. Estonia, 
No. 64569/09 (ECtHR, June 16, 2015). 
 127 See Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 
29/10/2014, “Rodriguez, Maria Belen c. Google, Inc. / daños y perjuicios,” R.522.XLIX, (Arg.). 
 128 A detailed discussion of this trend will be the subject of a forthcoming paper. See Giancarlo F. 
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papers.cfm?abstract_id=2980786 [https://perma.cc/8B34-UF2V]. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
40 
At first glance, inconsistency with the EU acquis might irremediably 
plague the introduction of filtering obligations. The introduction of any 
filtering technology—thereby imposing a de facto general monitoring 
obligation as, in order to filter unwanted content, all content must be 
monitored129—would inevitably call into question necessary coordination 
with the eCommerce Directive. Apparently, this proposal would contradict 
the eCommerce Directive’s intermediary liability regime—in particular the 
no-monitoring rule set out in Article 15 of the eCommerce Directive.130 The 
eCommerce Directive prohibits general monitoring obligations, although it 
does allow national law to provide for monitoring obligations “in a specific 
case.”131 In order to distinguish general from specific monitoring 
obligations, it should be considered that (1) as an exception, specific 
monitoring obligations must be interpreted narrowly, (2) both the scope of 
the possible infringements and the amount of infringements that can be 
reasonably expected to be identified must be sufficiently narrow, and (3) it 
must be obvious which materials constitute an infringement.132 According 
to the above, the proposed obligation would fall in the former category, 
rather than the latter.133 
It goes without saying, the proposal openly conflicts with consistent—
and unambiguous—European jurisprudence. The European Court of Justice 
has reinforced the position that there is no room for general proactive 
monitoring and filtering mechanisms under EU law.134 In multiple cases, 
the Court has decided that the eCommerce Directive trumps conflicting 
measures in other intellectual property legislation.135 In SABAM v. Netlog, 
the Court specifically referenced hosting providers, using language that 
unmistakably covers the proposal in Article 13. According to the ECJ, 
European law must be interpreted as preventing nations from requiring a 
hosting provider to install a system for filtering: (1) information which is 
stored on its servers by its service users; (2) which applies indiscriminately 
 
 129 See Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA v. 
Netlog NV, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 85 (Feb. 16, 2012), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0360&rid=3 [https://perma.cc/3KRE-UJD8]. 
 130 See eCommerce Directive, supra note 2, at Art. 15, § 1. 
 131 Id. at Recital 47. 
 132 Van Eecke, supra note 3, at 1486–87. 
 133 Id. 
 134 See Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Éditeurs 
SCRL, 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS I-12006, I-120202 (Nov. 24, 2011) http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=81776&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=f
irst&part=1&cid=131553#Footref2 [https://perma.cc/FP64-E2L2] (access providers); C-360/10, supra 
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 135 See C-324/09, supra note 106, at § 139; C-70/10, supra note 134, at § 40; C-360/10, supra note 
129, at § 52. 
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to all of those users; (3) as a preventative measure; (4) exclusively at its 
expense; and (5) for an unlimited period, (6) which is capable of 
identifying electronic files containing musical, cinematographic, or audio-
visual works.136 
Also, this proposal is systemically inconsistent with EU law because it 
would create a strict liability regime, rather than a negligence-based 
regime.137 At present, the eCommerce intermediary liability regime can be 
categorized as a negligence regime based on actual or constructive 
knowledge.138 The hosting exemption works according to a notice and take 
down regime: upon knowledge of the infringement occurring through its 
services, the intermediary must act expeditiously to remove the infringing 
materials.139 Introducing a strict liability system for online intermediaries 
will upset the delicate balance between copyright protection and other 
fundamental rights like access to information, freedom of expression, and 
freedom of business. Intermediaries should be governed by the general 
rules of civil liability (based on negligence), not strict liability IP rules. In 
the words of the Advocate General of the European Court of Justice—
which, although crafted in the context of trademark infringement online, 
would apply mutatis mutandis to copyright as well: 
Liability rules are more appropriate, since they do not fundamentally change 
the decentralised nature of the internet by giving trade mark proprietors 
general—and virtually absolute—control over the use in cyberspace of 
keywords which correspond to their trade marks. Instead of being able to 
prevent, through trade mark protection, any possible use—including, as has 
been observed, many lawful and even desirable uses—trade mark proprietors 
would have to point to specific instances giving rise to Google’s liability in 
the context of illegal damage to their trade marks.140 
A negligence-based system would better balance the people’s right to 
information, freedom of expression, and freedom of business with the 
protection of copyrights. 
Filtering technologies—in a related fashion to that just mentioned 
above—might conflict with fundamental rights by erring on the side of 
copyright protection. According to the ECJ, filtering would not be as “fair 
 
 136 See Netlog, supra note 129, at §§ 26, 52. 
 137 Pablo Baistrocchi, Liability of Intermediary Service Providers in the EU Directive on Electronic 
Commerce, 19 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 111, 114 (2002). 
 138 Id. 
 139 See eCommerce Directive, supra note 2, at Art. 14, § 1. 
 140 Joined Cases C-236, 237 & 238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 
2009 E.C.R. I-2423, I-2457 (Advocate General Opinion), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62008CC0236&rid=3 [https://perma.cc/QS3V-USVT]. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
42 
and proportionate” as the proposal suggests.141 Instead, filtering 
technologies would rather fail to strike a “fair balance” between copyright 
and other fundamental rights.142 They would undermine users’ freedom of 
expression and right to privacy143 and the provider’s freedom to conduct 
business.144 In particular, in the words of the European Court of Justice, 
these measures “could potentially undermine freedom of information, since 
that system might not distinguish adequately between unlawful content and 
lawful content.”145 First, automatic infringement assessment systems might 
undermine the enjoyment of users’ exceptions and limitations.146 Digital 
rights management’s effects on exceptions and limitations have been 
highlighted by copious literature.147 Similar conclusions apply to this 
scenario. Automated systems cannot replace human judgment flagging a 
certain use as fair—or within the scope of an exception or limitation.148 
Also, complexities regarding the public domain status of certain works, for 
example, might confuse the content recognition technologies.149 At the 
present level of technological sophistication, false positives (content 
incorrectly flagged as protected) would have chilling effects that would 
undermine freedom of information, expression, and possibly business. 
Finally, monitoring obligations erect barriers to innovation by making 
it more expensive for platforms to enter and compete in the market. The 
proposal’s suggested monitoring obligations would force intermediaries to 
develop and deploy costly technology.150 The ECJ has emphasized in the 
past that such an obligation “would result in a serious infringement of the 
freedom of the hosting service provider to conduct its business.”151 In 
particular, according to the ECJ, this obligation would be contrary to 
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 142 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C326) 391. 
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Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive, which provides that “procedures 
and remedies necessary to ensure the enforcement of the intellectual 
property rights . . . shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly . . . and 
shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to 
legitimate trade.”152 Whether technology is too costly—therefore limiting 
market incentives for present market players—might be up to debate as 
shown by the Allostreaming case in France and the Dafra case in Brazil.153 
In both cases Google’s so-called “technical defense”—asserting that 
filtering was too costly and therefore technically unfeasible—was refuted 
by the courts on the basis of expert-testimony reports to the contrary.154 In 
any event, the proposal’s suggested monitoring obligation would have the 
most negative effect on companies that do not currently own any 
proprietary recognition technology, widening the gap between established 
and upcoming intermediaries. In particular, European intermediaries will 
be at a disadvantage because they will have to license filtering technologies 
from US companies like Google/YouTube and Audible Magic155 because 
currently no European companies make competitive filtering technologies. 
As most established market players are US-based, this proposal might once 
again be a bad tradeoff for European companies—and push the Digital 
Single Market further away, rather than promoting it. 
C. Notice and Take-Down, Notice and Action, Notice and Stay-Down 
The proposal would also require intermediaries to “put in place 
complaints and redress mechanisms that are available to users in case of 
disputes” over filtered content.156 The proposal does not develop further on 
how this counter-notice mechanism should work in practice. It does not 
provide for the development of best practices or standardization for 
counter-notices, while it does so for filtering mechanisms.157 More 
importantly, little or nothing is known on how filtering measures will work 
in practice. Should intermediaries filter everything under the sun? Should 
they apply recognition technologies only to a preexisting blacklist of 
protected works? Most likely, the specifics of both the filtering and redress 
system might result from voluntary efforts and best practices promoted by 
 
 152 See Enforcement Directive, supra note 21, at Art. 3. 
 153 See APC, supra note 125; Dafra, supra note 125. 
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 155 See About, AUDIBLE MAGIC, http://www.audiblemagic.com (a company labeling itself as “the 
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the industry alone, resembling closely a sectorial notice-and-take-down 
system. 
In this regard, it is odd that the proposal requires intermediaries to 
provide a redress mechanism for proactive takedowns, while overlooking 
the issue of a legislatively mandated—and long-awaited—horizontal 
notice-and-take-down system under the eCommerce Directive 
framework.158 For the sake of systemic consistency, EU law should first set 
up a general notice-and-take-down and counter-notice system.159 However, 
this is apparently not likely: as mentioned in the OP&DSM 
Communication, EU-wide notice-and-action procedures will be postponed 
for now as the Commission will assess the impact of ongoing reforms 
first.160 
For the future, a couple of additional options—besides the 
aforementioned horizontal notice-and-takedown system—are being 
considered. First, a sectorial, problem-driven approach might utilize notice-
and-action procedures with different requirements for the content of the 
notice.161 According to the results of the Consultation on Online 
Intermediaries, different categories of illegal content require different 
notice-and-action procedures, especially content related to intellectual 
property rights, child abuse content, racism, and xenophobia.162 Second, the 
Enforcement Directive might also be amended to explicitly establish that 
national courts must be allowed to order intermediaries to take measures 
aimed not only at ending past and ongoing infringements, but also at 
preventing further infringements. In that respect, according to the 
Consultation on Modernization of IPRs’ Enforcement, the Directive should 
establish criteria on how “take down and stay down” should be undertaken 
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without establishing a general monitoring obligation.163 The viability of this 
approach remains to be seen. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The upcoming European Digital Single Market reform endorses a 
reaction to the platform economy that might prove a bad policy approach. 
A narrative emphasizing the “value gap”—rather than the added value—of 
the platform economy is counter-intuitive and disconnected from empirical 
evidence. The Commission’s reform package is apparently based solely on 
content industry assumptions and ignores much evidence that shows the 
positive effects that platforms, the internet, and digitization have had on 
creativity. Overlooking this empirical evidence might result in a reform that 
will prove obsolete before it is implemented, and possibly be detrimental 
for the Digital Single Market. 
In addition, the present reform proposal might threaten systemic 
consistency. The reform suggests revising intermediary liability principles 
through a so-called “sectorial approach,” rather than amending the 
eCommerce Directive. This policy strategy is a sloppy attempt to 
circumvent the lack of consensus behind an amendment to the present 
intermediary liability regimes that might create unavoidable conflicts 
between norms. Intermediary liability reform should happen first and 
foremost in the context of the eCommerce Directive, rather than through 
sectorial copyright and audio-visual reform or the promotion of voluntary 
self-regulatory actions. 
Finally, the proposed EU reform deploys a strategy that would 
apparently turn online intermediaries into internet police. In truth, this 
comes as little surprise. Since the inception of the internet, governments 
and IP rightholders have attempted to enlist intermediaries to rid the 
internet of allegedly infringing and illicit materials. Proactive monitoring 
and “notice and stay-down” regimes would definitely be a step in that 
direction. Meanwhile, the endorsement of voluntary measures as a 
privileged tool to curb illicit and infringing activities online makes 
intermediaries prone to serve governmental purposes under murky, 
privately-enforced standards, rather than transparent legal obligations duly 
enforced by delegated agencies or the judiciary. In this sense, the 
intermediary liability discourse is shifting towards an intermediary 
responsibility discourse. This process might be pushing an amorphous 
notion of responsibility that incentivizes intermediaries’ self-intervention to 
police allegedly infringing activities on the internet. Under this approach, 
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due process and fundamental guarantees are replaced by algorithmic 
enforcement, silencing speech according to the mainstream ethical 
discourse. Ironically, such reforms might end up achieving the opposite of 
a culturally independent European Digital Single Market by promoting 
globalized enforcement via algorithms developed and controlled by major 
Silicon Valley companies. 
 
